#  Book IV, Prosa 5 

 



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*Providence rules Fortune*

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'That is true,' I said; 'but it is your kind office to unravel the causes   
of hidden matters, and explain reasons now veiled in darkness; wherefore I   
beg of you, put forth your decree and expound all to me, since this wonder   
most deeply stirs my mind.'   
  
Then said she, smiling, 'Your question calls me to the greatest of all   
these matters, and a full answer thereto is well-nigh impossible. For this   
is its kind: if one doubt be cut away, innumerable others arise, as the   
Hydra`s heads; and there can be no limit unless a man restrains them by the   
most quick fire of the mind. For herein lie the questions of the directness   
of Providence, the course of Fate, chances which cannot be foreseen,   
knowledge, divine predestination, and freedom of judgment. You can judge   
for yourself the weight of these questions. But since it is a part of your   
treatment to know some of these, I will attempt to make some advantage   
therefrom, though we are penned in by our narrow space of time. But   
  
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if you enjoy the delights of song, you must wait a while for that pleasure,   
while I weave together for you the chain of reasons.'   
  
'As you will,' said I. Then, as though beginning afresh, she spake thus:   
  
'The engendering of all things, the whole advance of all changing natures,   
and every motion and progress in the world, draw their causes, their order,   
and their forms from the allotment of the unchanging mind of God, which   
lays manifold restrictions on all action from the calm fortress of its own   
directness. Such restrictions are called Providence when they can be seen to   
lie in the very simplicity of divine understanding; but they were called   
Fate in old times when they were viewed with reference to the objects which   
they moved or arranged. It will easily be understood that these two are   
very different if the mind examines the force of each. For Providence is   
the very divine reason which arranges all things, and rests with the   
supreme disposer of all; while Fate is that ordering which is a part of all   
changeable things, and by means of which Providence binds all things   
together in their own order. Providence embraces all things equally,   
however different they may be, even however infinite: when they are   
assigned to their own places, forms, and times, Fate sets them in an   
orderly motion; so that this development of the temporal order, unified in   
the intelligence of the mind of God, is Providence.   
  
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The working of this unified development in time is called Fate. These are   
different, but the one hangs upon the other. For this order, which is ruled   
by Fate, emanates from the directness of Providence. Just as when a   
craftsman perceives in his mind the form of the object he would make, he   
sets his working power in motion, and brings through the order of time that   
which he had seen directly and ready present to his mind. So by Providence   
does God dispose all that is to be done, each thing by itself and   
unchangeably; while these same things which Providence has arranged are   
worked out by Fate in many ways and in time. Whether, therefore, Fate works   
by the aid of the divine spirits which serve Providence, or whether it   
works by the aid of the soul, or of all nature, or the motions of the stars   
in heaven, or the powers of angels, or the manifold skill of other spirits,   
whether the course of Fate is bound together by any or all of these, one   
thing is certain, namely that Providence is the one unchangeable direct   
power which gives form to all things which are to come to pass, while Fate   
is the changing bond, the temporal order of those things which are arranged   
to come to pass by the direct disposition of God. Wherefore everything   
which is subject to Fate is also subject to Providence, to which Fate is   
itself subject. But there are things which, though beneath Providence, are   
above the course of Fate. Those things are they which are immovably set   
nearest the   
  
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primary divinity, and are there beyond the course of the movement of Fate.   
As in the case of spheres moving round the same axis, that which is nearest   
the centre approaches most nearly the simple motion of the centre, and is   
itself, as it were, an axis around which turn those which are set outside   
it. That sphere which is outside all turns through a greater circuit, and   
fulfils a longer course in proportion as it is farther from the central   
axis; and if it be joined or connect itself with that centre, it is drawn   
into the direct motion thereof, and no longer strays or strives to turn   
away. In like manner, that which goes farther from the primary   
intelligence, is bound the more by the ties of Fate, and the nearer it   
approaches the axis of all, the more free it is from Fate. But that which   
clings without movement to the firm intellect above, surpasses altogether   
the bond of Fate. As, therefore, reasoning is to understanding; as that   
which becomes is to that which is; as time is to eternity; as the   
circumference is to the centre: so is the changing course of Fate to the   
immovable directness of Providence. That course of Fate moves the heavens   
and the stars, moderates the first principles in their turns, and alters   
their forms by balanced interchangings. The same course renews all things   
that are born and wither away by like advances of offspring and seed. It   
constrains, too, the actions and fortunes of men by an unbreakable chain of   
causes: and these causes must be unchangeable, as they   
  
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proceed from the beginnings of an unchanging Providence. Thus is the world   
governed for the best if a directness, which rests in the intelligence of   
God, puts forth an order of causes which may not swerve. This order   
restrains by its own unchangeableness changeable things, which might   
otherwise run hither and thither at random. Wherefore in disposing the   
universe this limitation directs all for good, though to you who are not   
strong enough to comprehend the whole order, all seems confusion and   
disorder. Naught is there that comes to pass for the sake of evil, or due   
to wicked men, of whom it has been abundantly shewn that they seek the   
good, but misleading error turns them from the right course; for never does   
the true order, which comes forth from the centre of the highest good, turn   
any man aside from the right beginning.   
  
'But you will ask, "What more unjust confusion could exist than that good   
men should sometimes enjoy prosperity, sometimes suffer adversity, and that   
the bad too should sometimes receive what they desire, sometimes what they   
hate?" Are then men possessed of such infallible minds that they, whom   
they consider honest or dishonest, must necessarily be what they are held   
to be? No, in these matters human judgment is at variance with itself, and   
those who are held by some to be worthy of reward, are by others held   
worthy of punishment. But let us grant that a man could discern between   
good and bad characters. Can   
  
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he therefore know the inmost feelings of the soul, as a doctor can learn a   
body`s temperature? For it is no less a wonder to the ignorant why sweet   
things suit one sound body, while bitter things suit another; or why some   
sick people are aided by gentle draughts, others by sharp and bitter ones.   
But a doctor does not wonder at such things, for he knows the ways and   
constitutions of health and sickness. And what is the health of the soul   
but virtue? and what the sickness, but vice? And who is the preserver of   
the good and banisher of the evil, who but God, the guardian and healer of   
minds? God looks forth from the high watch-tower of His Providence, He   
sees what suits each man, and applies to him that which suits him. Hence   
then comes that conspicuous cause of wonder in the order of Fate, when a   
wise man does that which amazes the ignorant. For, to glance at the depth   
of God`s works with so few words as human reason is capable of   
comprehending, I say that what you think to be most fair and most conducive   
to justice`s preservation, that appears different to an all-seeing   
Providence. Has not our fellow-philosopher Lucan told us how the   
conquering cause did please the gods, but the conquered, Cato? What then   
surprises you when done on this   
  
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earth, is the true-guided order of things; it is your opinion which is   
perverted and confused. But if there is any one whose life is so good that   
divine and human estimates of him agree, yet he must be uncertain in the   
strength of his mind; if any adversity befall him, it may always be that he   
will cease to preserve his innocence, by which he found that he could not   
preserve his good fortune. Thus then a wise dispensation spares a man who   
might be made worse by adversity, lest he should suffer when it is not good   
for him to be oppressed. Another may be perfected in all virtues, wholly   
conscientious, and very near to God: Providence holds that it is not right   
such an one should receive any adversity, so that it allows him to be   
troubled not even by bodily diseases. As a better man than I has said,

"The powers of virtues build up the body of a good man." It often happens   
that the duty of a supreme authority is assigned to good men for the   
purpose of pruning the insolent growth of wickedness. To some, Providence   
grants a mingled store of good and bad, according to the nature of their   
minds. Some she treats bitterly, lest they grow too exuberant with long   
  
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continued good fortune; others she allows to be harassed by hardships that   
the virtues of their minds should be strengthened by the habit and exercise   
of patience. Some have too great a fear of sufferings which they can bear;   
others have too great contempt for those which they cannot bear: these she   
leads on by troubles to make trial of themselves. Some have brought a name   
to be honoured for all time at the price of a glorious death. Some by   
shewing themselves undefeated by punishment, have left a proof to others   
that virtue may be invincible by evil. What doubt can there be of how   
rightly such things are disposed, and that they are for the good of those   
whom we see them befall? The other point too arises from like causes, that   
sometimes sorrows, sometimes the fulfilment of their desires, falls to the   
wicked. As concerns the sorrows, no one is surprised, because all agree   
that they deserve ill. Their punishments serve both to deter others from   
crime by fear, and also to amend the lives of those who undergo them; their   
happiness, on the other hand, serves as a proof to good men of how they   
should regard good fortune of this nature, which they see often attends   
upon the dishonest. And another thing seems to me to be well arranged: the   
nature of a man may be so headstrong and rough that lack of wealth may stir   
him to crime more readily than restrain him; for the disease of such an one   
Providence prescribes a remedy of stores of patrimony: he may see   
  
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that his conscience is befouled by sin, he may take account with himself of   
his fortune, and will perhaps fear lest the loss of this property, of which   
he enjoys the use, may bring unhappiness. Wherefore he will change his   
ways, and leave off from ill-doing so long as he fears the loss of his   
fortune. Again, good fortune, unworthily improved, has flung some into   
ruin. To some the right of punishing is committed that they may use it for   
the exercise and trial of the good, and the punishment of evil men. And   
just as there is no league between good and bad men, so also the bad cannot   
either agree among themselves: nay, with their vices tearing their own   
consciences asunder, they cannot agree with themselves, and do often   
perform acts which, when done, they perceive that they should not have   
done. Wherefore high Providence has thus often shewn her strange wonder,   
namely, that bad men should make other bad men good. For some find   
themselves suffering injustice at the hands of evil men, and, burning with   
hatred of those who have injured them, they have returned to cultivate the   
fruits of virtue, because their aim is to be unlike those whom they hate.   
To divine power, and to that alone, are evil things good, when it uses them   
suitably so as to draw good results therefrom. For a definite order   
embraces all things, so that even when some subject leaves the true place   
assigned to it in the order, it returns to an order, though another, it may   
be, lest aught   
  
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in the realm of Providence be left to random chance. But "hard is it for me   
to set forth all these matters as a god," nor is it right for a man to   
try to comprehend with his mind all the means of divine working, or to   
explain them in words. Let it be enough that we have seen that God, the   
Creator of all nature, directs and disposes all things for good. And while   
He urges all, that He has made manifest, to keep His own likeness, He   
drives out by the course of Fate all evil from the bounds of His state.   
Wherefore if you look to the disposition of Providence, you will reckon   
naught as bad of all the evils which are held to abound upon earth.   
  
'But I see that now you are weighed down by the burden of the question, and   
wearied by the length of our reasoning, and waiting for the gentleness of   
song. Take then your draught, be refreshed thereby and advance further the   
stronger.   
  
Translated by: W.V. Cooper, J.M. Dent and Company. London, 1902.